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Evidence. Buja v. Morningstar, 688 A.2d 817 (R.I. 1997). In a
malpractice action, a proposed expert witness need not be board
certified nor have other training or experience in the same spe-
cialty as the defendant-physician, provided that the expert has
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in the field of
the alleged malpractice.
In Buja v. Morningstar,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court re-
affirmed its holding in Marshall v. Medical Associates of Rhode Is-
land, Inc. 2 regarding the qualifications of an expert witness in a
medical-malpractice case. The court held that a party proposing
expert testimony to support its allegation of medical malpractice
against a defendant-physician need not offer an expert who is
board certified or otherwise trained in the same specialty as the
defendant. A person may give testimony as long as that person
has the "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education ... in
the field of the alleged malpractice."3
FACTS AND CASE TRAVEL
Brenda and Brian Buja enrolled in a clinic at Memorial Hospi-
tal in Providence, Rhode Island, where Brenda received prenatal
treatment from Dr. Linda Lacerte, a resident in family practice.
4
Brenda went into labor on December 14, 1990. Dr. Lacerte, along
with Dr. Howard Morningstar, also a family-practice resident,
handled Brenda's labor.5 The doctors were supervised by Dr. Law-
rence Culpepper. Dr. Culpepper left the hospital prior to Brenda
giving birth, but was relieved by another doctor.6 Kayla Joy Buja
(plaintiff) was eventually delivered by emergency vacuum extrac-
tion by the relieving doctor.7 Both Dr. Lacerte and Dr.
Morningstar were present with the relieving doctor during the de-
livery. At some point during delivery, Kayla was deprived of oxy-
gen. She was later diagnosed with cerebral palsy, spastic
1. 688 A.2d 817 (R.I. 1997) (per curiam).
2. 677 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1996) (per curiam).
3. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-41 (Supp. 1996).
4. See Buja, 688 A.2d at 818.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
quadriplegia and mental retardation, all of which resulted from
the oxygen deprivation. s
At trial in the Rhode Island Superior Court, the plaintiffs of-
fered the testimony of an expert witness who was board certified in
obstetrics and had extensive knowledge, skill, experience, training
and education in obstetrics.9 The defendants filed a motion in
limine to preclude the expert from testifying. The defendants sug-
gested that the expert was not qualified as a family practitioner
and could not testify as to the standard of care of a family practi-
tioner who, unlike obstetrical practitioners, only deliver children
occasionally.' 0 The trial judge granted the motion in limine on the
grounds that an expert witness had to be an expert in family prac-
tice to testify against a defendant who was a family practitioner."
From this ruling, the plaintiffs appealed.' 2
BACKGROUND
Section 9-19-41 of the Rhode Island General Laws, currently
governing the qualifications of an expert witness proffered to tes-
tify in a malpractice case, provides:
In any legal action based upon a cause of action arising on or
after January 1, 1987, for personal injury or wrongful death
filed against a licensed physician, hospital, clinic, health
maintenance organization, professional service corporation
providing health care services, dentists or dental hygienist
based on professional negligence, only those persons who by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education qualify as
experts in the field of the alleged malpractice shall be permit-
ted to give expert testimony as to the alleged malpractice.'i
Section 9-19-41 was enacted for the purpose of statutorily pre-
scribing the criteria necessary for a court to qualify a witness as an
expert witness in medical-malpractice cases.' 4 In Marshall v. Med-
ical Associates of Rhode Island,'5 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that section 9-19-41 should not be interpreted so narrowly as
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-41 (Supp. 1996).
14. See Owens v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 670 A.2d 1240, 1244 n.6 (R.I. 1996).
15. 677 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1996) (per curiam).
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to allow only an expert who is either board certified or who has
some other special training or knowledge in the specialty of the
defendant-physician.16
In Marshall, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a trial
court's decision to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs expert
who was board certified in pediatrics and family medicine.17 The
defendant was an emergency-room physician and internist who
treated the plaintiff for an animal bite. The plaintiffs expert's
qualifications included routine treatment of hundreds of animal-
bite wounds and lectures on the topic at various medical schools.' 8
The court stated that it is not grounds for automatic disqualifica-
tion if a proffered expert is not board certified or practicing in the
same specialty as the defendant under section 9-19-41. The fact
that the expert is not board certified or practicing in the same spe-
cialty as the defendant merely goes to the weight given by the fact
finder to the opinion of the expert. 19
Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled on a case
in which a plaintiff was suing an anesthesiologist for medical mal-
practice. 20 The plaintiff alleged that the anesthesiologist chipped
his two front teeth while intubating2' him for surgery.22 The
plaintiff offered the testimony of an emergency medical technician
(EMT) as an expert in intubation.23 The trial court ruled that the
EMT was not qualified to testify. The South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed.24 The supreme court ruled that the EMT had the
requisite training and knowledge to testify as an expert in intuba-
tion, although he had less medical training and education than the
defendant.25
16. See id. at 426.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 426-27.
19. See id. at 427.
20. See Gooding v. St. Francis Xavier Hosp., 487 S.E.2d 596 (S.C. 1997).
21. See id. An intubation is the placing of an endotracheal tube into a patient's
trachea to provide a clear airway and to prevent aspiration of foreign materials
into the lungs. See id. at 597 n.1.
22. See id. at 597.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. The proffered evidence at trial included a videotape of the witness
demonstrating the proper technique for intubation. He also testified that he had
intubated hundreds of patients and instructs physicians on intubation. See id, at
596.
SURVEY SECTION
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In Buja, the Rhode Island Supreme Court followed its holding
in Marshall and held that a proffered expert in a medical-malprac-
tice case does not have to practice in the same specialty as the de-
fendant. However, the expert must meet one of the criteria of
section 9-19-41 of possessing the necessary "knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training or education.., in the field of the alleged malprac-
tice."26 According to the court, section 9-19-41 does not require
that the witness be an expert in the field in which the malpractice
occurred, nor does it require the witness to be practicing in the
defendant's specialty.27 The statute's language is plain and unam-
biguous and clearly expresses the view of the General Assembly.
Because the Bujas' expert witness was qualified in the field of ob-
stetrics, the field of the alleged malpractice, he was qualified to tes-
tify as an expert witness even though he did not practice in the
same specialty as the defendant. 28
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has established that section
9-19-41 should not be construed to require a plaintiff in a medical-
malpractice case to search within the limited scope of the defend-
ant's specialty to obtain expert testimony regarding the defend-
ant's alleged malpractice. In doing so, the court remains true to the
statute's clear and unambiguous language. The witness need only
meet one of the enumerated criteria set forth in the statute to be
qualified to testify as an expert witness.
Karen M. Hagan
26. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-41 (Supp. 1996).
27. See Buja, 688 A.2d at 819.
28. See id.
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Evidence. State v. Griffin, 691 A.2d 556 (R.I. 1997). A proposed
expert witness need not have possession of the murder weapon to
testify concerning its characteristics, provided that the proponent
of the evidence sets forth a sufficient factual foundation to remove
the expert's opinion from the area of speculation. The proponent of
expert testimony by a handwriting analyst need not demonstrate
with absolute certainty that a handwriting sample is authentic,
provided that the trial judge may conclude that it is reasonably
probable that the evidence is what its offeror proclaims it to be.
In State v. Griffin,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court empha-
sized the wide discretion accorded to trial judges in the admission
of expert testimony under Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 702 and
901. The court held that expert testimony regarding the character-
istics of the alleged murder weapon is admissible under Rule 702
as long as a sufficient factual foundation exists to remove the testi-
mony from the realm of mere speculation. 2 In addition, the court
held that testimony by a handwriting analyst based on samples of
the defendant's writing is admissible under Rule 901 if the trial
judge concludes that it is reasonably probable that the proffered
evidence is what its proponent purports it to be.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
A house party in South Providence, Rhode Island resulted in
one man's death and another man's conviction for murder.4 The
defendant, Miles Griffin, shot and killed a fellow partygoer with a
.38 caliber revolver after a minor altercation.5 One witness ob-
served Griffin jam a .357 bullet into his .38 revolver.6 Another wit-
ness saw Griffin prying a .357 shell from the same weapon. 7
1. 691 A.2d 556 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id. at 558.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 557.
5. See id. An eyewitness testified that the victim asked Griffin if he "had any
static or whatever." Griffin replied in the negative, but proceeded to shoot the curi-
ous reveler in the eye. Id. at 557.
6. See id. at 558.
7. See id. at 557.
SURVEY SECTION
Furthermore, several friends overheard Griffin bragging about the
killing.8
At trial, the judge allowed the prosecution to present testi-
mony by two expert witnesses-a firearms expert and a handwrit-
ing analyst. The firearms expert testified that certain .38 caliber
revolvers may be modified to fire .357 bullets.9 The handwriting
analyst opined that Griffin was the author of a threatening letter
that had been sent to a key prosecution witness before the trial
began.' 0 The analyst arrived at his conclusion by comparing the
letter to two other documents allegedly penned by Griffin." The
jury subsequently convicted Griffin of second-degree murder and
possession of a firearm while committing a violent crime. 12
The defendant challenged the admission of the experts' testi-
mony. First, Griffin contended that the failure of the police to lo-
cate the murder weapon rendered the firearm expert's opinion
regarding the gun's characteristics mere guesswork. 3 Second,
Griffin challenged the admission of the handwriting analyst's ex-
pert opinion. 14 He contended that the prosecution failed to au-
thenticate the documents used by the analyst to arrive at his
opinion.'6
BACKGROUND
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
Testimony by Experts-If scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
8. See id. Witnesses testified that Griffin boasted about having "shot this
cat at a party," and embellished the gory tale by adding that "his eye came out,
too." Id. at 558.
9. See id. at 557. The firearms expert explained that .38 Specials can be
modified to fire .357 bullets, while .38 Smith & Wessons may not be. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 558. The two sets of documents were (1) several waiver-of-rights
forms signed by Griffin and (2) a letter allegedly sent by Griffin to the warden. See
id.
12. See id. at 557-58.
13. See id. at 558. Griffin pointed out that, since the police had not located the
murder weapon, they could not conclusively state whether it was a .38 Special or a
.38 Smith & Wesson. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
1998]
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fled as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion.' 6
The language of Rule 702 emphasizes the value of expert testi-
mony in assisting the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.17 Decisions regarding the qualifications
of a witness to express an opinion are within the discretion of the
trial judge and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard.' 8 Testimony by an expert must be based on facts which are
legally sufficient to form a basis for the expert's conclusion. 19
In State v. Boucher, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld
the trial judge's decision to exclude expert testimony by a defense
witness.20 The witness was to provide testimony about the
shrinkage characteristics of the jacket found on the body of the vic-
tim.2' The expert witness did not have the requisite familiarity
with the fabric of the jacket to testify that the garment would not
shrink as a result of immersion. 22 Therefore, the court found the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion. 23
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 901 provides:
Requirement of Authentication or Identification-(a) General
Provision. The requirement of authentication or identifica-
tion as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims. 24
Rule 901 requires that the proponent of evidence to authenticate
the evidence with facts sufficient to support a finding that the evi-
dence is what it is claimed to be.25 In State v. Ducharme,26 the
16. R.I. R. Evid. 702.
17. See State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 781 (R.I. 1996).
18. See State v. Boucher, 542 A.2d 236, 239 (R.I. 1988).
19. See id. at 239-40; see, e.g., Greco v. Mancini, 476 A.2d 522, 525 (R.I. 1984);
State v. Fogarty, 433 A.2d 972, 977 (R.I. 1981).
20. Boucher, 542 A.2d at 239.
21. See id. The victim was found wearing a jacket which purportedly belonged
to the defendant. The defendant argued that the jacket was too small to fit him,
and denied the prosecution's assertion that it had shrunk as a result of being im-
mersed in water. See id.
22. See id. at 240. The trial judge determined that the expert witness, a textile
finisher, was qualified to give a general opinion about the shrinkage of completed
garments. See id.
23. See id.
24. R.I. R. Evid. 901(a).
25. Id.
26. 601 A.2d 937 (R.I. 1991).
SURVEY SECTION
Rhode Island Supreme Court lent a flexible interpretation to Rule
901.27 The trial judge allowed the prosecution to admit two hand-
written notes which were allegedly authored by the defendant.28
During his taped statement to the police, the defendant stated that
he had left two notes, one on a car and another at a bank.29 The
defendant argued that the notes were not properly authenticated
under Rule 901.30 The court rejected this argument, holding that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by concluding that it
was reasonably probable "that the evidence was what the prosecu-
tion purported it to be: the notes defendant had referred to in his
taped statement."31 In Ducharme, the supreme court held that
Rule 901 is satisfied as long as the evidence in the record supports
a conclusion that it is reasonably probable that the evidence is
what it is purported to be. 32
While questions of authentication and admissibility are solely
within the discretion of the trial judge, the finder of fact is free to
accord any amount of weight it chooses to expert testimony.33 "It
is the jury's function to decide the weight to give to the evidence."34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In Griffin, the Rhode Island Supreme Court emphasized the
wide discretion the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence grant to trial
judges.36 The court upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the
testimony of the firearms expert, despite the State's failure to lo-
cate the actual weapon used in the slaying.36 The court reasoned
that the testimony of the eyewitnesses provided a sufficient factual
27. See id. at 944.
28. See id. at 943. (stating that one of the anonymous notes was found at an
automated-bank-teller machine, and the other was found under the windshield
wiper of an automobile).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 944. The defendant argued that the handwriting in the docu-
ments must be attributed to him with scientific certainty in order for them to be
authenticated. The prosecution relied on a taped statement the defendant made to
police in which he referred to the notes in question. See id. at 943-44.
31. Id. at 944.
32. Id.
33. See State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14, 25 (R.I. 1991) (citing State v. Vargus,
373 A.2d 150, 157 (R.I. 1977)).
34. Ducharme, 601 A.2d at 944.
35. Griffin, 691 A.2d at 558 (stating that "[t]rial justices have wide discretion
in connection with the admission of expert testimony").
36. See id.
1998]
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foundation upon which the expert witness could form a
conclusion. 37
Unlike the proposed expert witness in State v. Boucher, the
firearms expert had knowledge of concrete facts which removed his
opinion from the realm of mere speculation. 38 Testimony by fellow
partygoers who saw Griffin jamming a .357 bullet into his .38 re-
volver, and by others who saw him prying a .357 shell from that
same revolver, provided a sufficient factual basis upon which the
firearms expert could base his opinion.3 9 The court concluded that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the firearms
expert to testify.40
The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the
testimony of the handwriting analyst.41 The fact that Griffin de-
nied authorship of one of the handwriting samples went to the
weight, rather than the admissibility, of the expert testimony.42
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the documents
used by the handwriting analyst to form his conclusion were not
properly authenticated. Relying on the flexible interpretation of
Rule 901 set forth in Ducharme, the court held that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion.43 The handwriting analyst was able
to pinpoint similarities between the handwriting on the waiver-of-
rights forms, which were admittedly signed by the defendant, and
a letter which the defendant denied writing. 4 The court held that
the trial judge acted within his discretion when he concluded it
was reasonably probable that the samples were what the State
purported them to be.45
The court explained that it remains the function of the jury to
assess the utility of the evidence presented by the prosecution. In
order to determine the value of the firearms expert's testimony, the
jury had to weigh the credibility of the partygoers. 46 In order to
assess the value of the handwriting analyst's testimony, the jury
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 557-58.
40. See id. at 558.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 558-59.
43. See id. at 558.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
had to determine whether it believed that the defendant had writ-
ten the letter to the warden.47 The court recognized that the deter-
mination of admissibility by the trial judge does not diminish the
ability of the jury to decide what weight to give to the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has long recognized the wide
discretion accorded trial judges in the admission of expert testi-
mony. The court will overturn such a decision only upon a finding
of an abuse of discretion. 48 Once admitted into evidence, the trier
of fact possesses the ability to weigh the credibility of the evidence
which is presented.4 9 The court's decision in State v. Griffin is con-
sistent with the spirit of assistance of the finder of fact found in the
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 50
Judith M. Andrade
47. See id.
48. See State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776 (R.I. 1996); State v. Capalbo, 433 A.2d
242, 246 (R.I. 1981); Leahey v. State, 397 A.2d 509, 510 (R.I. 1979).
49. See State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14 (R.I. 1991).
50. See Bryant, 670 A.2d at 782. The language of Rule 702 and the advisory
note point out that helpfulness to the trier of fact is a crucial issue. See id.
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